Historical Reflection

German high command, which during the final eighteen months of the war faced the crushing pressure of Allied air power over Western Europe, considered plans for several major blows intended to disrupt the offensive potential of its opponents. These were desperate schemes that bore little relation to reality, given the Allies’ overwhelming industrial, strategic, and tactical superiority.

Eduard Modeller‘s Den No. 9 - JANUARY 2026

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German high command, which during

the nal eighteen months of the war faced

the crushing pressure of Allied air power

over Western Europe, considered plans for

several major blows intended to disrupt

the oensive potenal of its opponents.

These were desperate schemes that bore

lile relaon to reality, given the Allies’

overwhelming industrial, strategic, and

taccal superiority.

Around noon on December 31, 1944,

the commanders of all Jagdgeschwader

subordinated to II. Jagdkorps received the

order “Varus 1.1.45 - Teutonicus,” which

they had been expecng for two weeks.

The message announced that Operaon

Bodenplae was to be carried out, as

planned at a conference on 14 December

by the thirty-year-old Generalleutnant

Dietrich Peltz (Knight’s Cross with Oak

Leaves, former General der Kampieger),

whom Hitler had appointed commander

of II. Jagdkorps. Bodenplae was

a coordinated aack by German ghter

units against Allied airelds in the

Netherlands, Belgium, and France,

intended to support the ground forces

ghng in the Ardennes.

Such an aack had been discussed

within the German command since

early December, and the rst proposed

date was 16 December, the very day the

German ground oensive in the Ardennes

began. While some commanders knew

which Allied airelds were to be targeted

by their units, for others this informaon

remained secret. In at least one case, the

commander of a Jagdgeschwader even

had a scale model of the target aireld

constructed to prepare aack taccs.

Nevertheless, preparaons for the

operaon were conducted with such

secrecy that some elements of the German

navy and an-aircra defenses were not

informed of the plan. This later led to

the misidencaon of air formaons by

ak gunners and to avoidable losses from

friendly re. The Allied ULTRA intelligence

service intercepted only a few messages

directly related to the preparaons, but

failed to connect them and thus did

not predict that a large-scale strike was

imminent. These included, for example, the

allocaon of signal ares to twin-engined

night ghters for formaon guidance,

or the pracce of ground-aack missions by

ghter units. As a means of supporng the

German ground advance in the Ardennes,

the air operaon was losing eecveness,

and some German commanders were

caught o guard by the chosen date of

the aack, 1 January 1945. Even decades

A crashed German Focke-Wulf Fw 190 D-9 (W.Nr. 210194) of Stab I./JG 2 near Dor/Stolberg,

south-east of Aachen, Germany. The plane of Fw. Werner Hohenberg was hit by ak during

Operaon Bodenplae on 1 January 1945 and the pilot was taken prisoner.

(Photo: U.S. Army Air Forces photo)

Jan Bobek

HISTORICAL REFLECTION