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HISTORY
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USS BLOCK ISLAND CVE-21
Aer the successful North African
landings, subsequent convoys extended to
Oran in Algeria, and with further successful
landings, the number of desnaon ports
grew.
Aer the landings in Sicily and southern
Italy in 1943, Naples was added as
a desnaon, rst reached by convoy UGF
11 on May 31, 1944. Aer the southern
France landings in 1944, Marseille was
added, rst reached by convoy UGF
15B. In total, 26 fast UGF convoys were
dispatched to the Mediterranean at
regular 27-day intervals, comprising 382
merchant ships—none of which were sunk
en route. The slower UGS convoys were
inially dispatched three mes a month
in 1943, with the frequency increasing to
six convoys per month by 1945. The last
warme convoy, UGS 95, departed from
Hampton Roads on May 28, 1945. By then,
100 slow UGS convoys had crossed the
Atlanc, carrying over 5,800 cargo ships.
Of those, only three were successfully
torpedoed by German submarines during
the Atlanc crossing.
Although 14 other merchant ships—
including the American vessel Thomas G.
Masaryk—were sunk in the Mediterranean
(three by aircra, two by Allied mines,
and ve during the return journey in
GUS convoys), the number of ships sunk
across these 126 convoys highlights the
high eecveness of convoy protecon
and, conversely, the fulity of German
submarine eorts to disrupt Allied logiscs
in the Atlanc during this period and the
broader second half of the war.
This shi was sudden and dramac.
In fall 1942, the situaon seemed under
German control—convoys were under
pressure from U-boats, which hunted and
selected their targets with lile resistance.
By mid-1943, the de had turned. The
baleeld was now dominated by Allied
aircra and convoy escort groups, and
German submarines found themselves
under increasing pressure. The hunters
had become the hunted. This reversal
was due to the Allies’ growing technical
and material superiority, the introducon
of new weapon types, and—most
importantly—new taccal approaches.
One of the most signicant was covering
the enre North and Central Atlanc with
aircra operang from land bases, and
strengthening destroyer escort groups,
typically composed of six escort destroyers
(CortDiv). Escort carriers were increasingly
added to convoys, providing constant air
cover.
A major enhancement in an-submarine
warfare came with the formaon of Hunter-
Killer Groups (HKGs) centered around
escort carriers, starng in the second
half of 1943. This new ASW taccs was
tested in summer 1943 by US Navy Task
Groups built around the escort carriers
AersueringheavylossesintheconvoybalesofMay1943,theU-Boat
CommandwithdrewGermansubmarinesfromtheNorthAtlancand
concentratedonaackingconvoysintheCentralAtlanc.Theseconvoys,
markedUG(UnitedStatestoGibraltar),UGS(UnitedStatestoGibraltarSlow
Convoys),andUGF(UnitedStatestoGibraltarFastConvoys),traveledbetween
theUnitedStatesandtheMediterranean.TherstconvoysdepartedfromNew
YorkandHamptonRoads,Virginia,inNovember1942asinvasionconvoysto
supportthelandingsinNorthAfrica(OperaonTorch),endinginCasablanca.
USS Card